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Abstract 
 
This paper documents and analyses gross job flows and their determinants in Ukraine using a 
data set of more than 2200 Ukrainian firms operating in manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
for the years 1998-2000. Job destruction dominates job creation in both 1999 and 2000. Another 
clear-cut result of our analysis is the strong positive effect of new private firms on net 
employment growth. We also find an inverse relationship between job reallocation and size for 
both manufacturing and non-manufacturing, while only in the latter sector is employment growth 
inversely related with size. The main focus of the paper is the effect of trade flows on 
employment adjustment in manufacturing. Our results show that both employment growth and 
job reallocation at the firm and two-digit sector level are affected by strong exposure to import 
competition and product market competition in export markets. These effects are more 
pronounced when we consider trade flows to the world at large and to the EU than when the 
analysis is based on trade flows to the CIS.  
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I. Introduction 
 
It is generally known that flexibility of the labour market is an important feature of well-
functioning market economies.  Davis and Haltiwanger (1999, 1992) and Baldwin, Dunne and 
Haltiwanger (1998) report that in the U.S. and in Canada roughly one in every ten jobs is created 
and one in every ten jobs is destroyed each year. Flexibility of the labour market is important 
because it permits the rapid reallocation of resources to the most efficient uses and thus it may be 
vital for economic growth. As suggested by Aghion and Howitt (1994), we might expect a 
relationship between gross job creation, destruction and productivity growth. Firms (sectors) that 
engage in restructuring destroy low productivity jobs and create high productivity ones. This 
leads to high job turnover, an increase in labour productivity and better general performance. 
However, a high degree of job reallocation may also have negative effects, at least in the short 
run, in terms of worker displacement and earnings losses, but the aggregate and long run benefits 
are more likely to compensate for the individual costs. 
These issues are particularly relevant for the post-communist economies, characterized by 
highly distorted factor allocations and many inefficient firms. The reallocation of labour from 
inefficient firms (usually non-restructured state and privatised firms) to efficient ones (usually 
new private and restructured state and privatised firms) is a desirable feature of a successful 
transition from plan to market. How job creation and destruction have contributed to this 
reallocation process has been the subject of a small burgeoning literature on job gross flows in 
Central Europe and the CIS.   
Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002) analyse the role of labour market flexibility for Estonia. 
According to their findings, Estonia’s transition process can be characterized as successful. The 
country’s approach to rapid reform has led the economy to sustainable GDP growth and to rates William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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of job reallocation similar to those reported for Western economies. Konings, Lehmann and 
Schaffer (1996) analyse gross flows of jobs in Poland at the start of transition and find high rates 
of gross job destruction, which are concentrated in state owned enterprises. This suggests that 
state owned enterprises in Poland rapidly engaged in downsizing. They also find that new private 
firms contribute disproportionately to job growth in the economy. The same patterns are found 
for most of the other Central and East European countries as shown in Faggio and Konings 
(2001).   
The purpose of this paper is to study gross flows of jobs in Ukraine, a transition country that 
has been lagging behind in reforms.  The paper focuses on the years 1998-2000, when Ukraine 
finally started to come out of a prolonged depression that lasted nearly a decade. Figure 1 shows 
the dismal performance of the Ukrainian economy over the nineties, with precipitous falls of 
GDP and real wages and a modest decline of employment.  Wage flexibility, forced unpaid leave 
and wage arrears on a scale even larger than in Russia can explain the diverging trends of GDP 
and employment.   What explains the overall dismal performance in the nineties? Some 
oligarchs, their co-opted cronies in parliament and the presidential administration, most of whom 
came from the Communist nomenclatura, had an iron grip on most economic activity in Ukraine 
throughout the nineties. These groups had captured all organs of the state and used them to their 
private economic benefit, maintaining weak property rights and an over-regulation of the 
privatised and emerging new private sector (Aslund, 2002).  In essence, supply was shackled by 
a “bad equilibrium” of maximised rent seeking by the oligarchs and their cronies and the 
overpowering presence of government bodies over-regulating economic agents, making Ukraine 
one of the most corrupt countries in the world. However, in 1998 and 1999 Ukraine experienced 
a severe balance of payments crisis leading to the first serious and quite radical reforms under the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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Yushchenko government, which successfully broke the iron grip of the oligarchs and liberalised 
supply for the first time in 2000 (Aslund, 2002). While the jury is still out on whether these 
reforms set Ukraine on a path of sustained growth
1, the evidence we shall present on job flows 
shows a clear hiatus between the nineties and the year 2000.    
Konings and Walsh (1999a,b) use survey data based on small samples to document gross job 
flows in Ukraine and Russia in the early nineties. They report job destruction being dominant in 
both countries reaching a peak of 15.3% in Ukraine in 1996 and of 16.7% in Russia in 1994. In 
contrast, in both countries they find rather modest job creation in the first half of the nineties, not 
exceeding 3%. They explain the high job destruction in Ukraine and Russia with the existence of 
‘disorganisation’ in the production process (cf. Blanchard and Kremer, 1997; Roland and 
Verdier, 1999).      
 
Apart from the two cited papers by Konings and Walsh there are some important studies on 
the reallocation process in the economies of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). For 
Russia, Brown and Earle (2002a) find that job destruction and reallocation rose markedly after 
the beginning of reforms and that job destruction was concentrated among the less productive 
firms in the second half of the nineties. Konings and Lehmann (2002), in addition, show that five 
years into the Russian transition employment responses in privatised firms are more strongly 
negatively correlated with wage movements than in state-owned firms pointing to the slowly 
emerging beneficial effects of privatisation on productivity. The data sets of both cited papers on 
Russia do not include new private firms; their contribution to the employment growth of the 
Russian economy is documented in Acquisti and Lehmann (2000). According to their evidence 
new private firms have disproportionately high job creation and destruction rates, the latter of 
                                                 
1 Once the balance of payment crisis had passed, the oligarchs managed to push prime minister Yushchenko out of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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which might be attributed to a relatively hostile environment for new businesses in Russia and 
the inexperience of managers to operate in this environment.  Brown and Earle (2002b) in a 
comparative study of Russian and Ukrainian “traditional” firms in manufacturing
2 provide 
evidence that the reforms undertaken in both countries had an impact on firm-level restructuring 
and labour reallocation. They also show that in Russia and Ukraine this labour reallocation has 
enhanced productivity and that these effects manifested themselves more rapidly in faster 
reforming Russia than in “laggard” Ukraine.  
Our paper makes several contributions. The paper has as one aim to document gross job 
flows in both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors in Ukraine for the years 1999 
and 2000, when Ukraine for the first time embarked on consistent reforms resulting in strong 
positive growth in the year 2000 (Aslund, 2002). We use large representative samples of firms in 
both the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing sectors, in order to compare  and contrast 
gross job flows in these two sectors. Since the Ukrainian economy was even more biased 
towards the manufacturing sector under central planning than other Soviet and East European 
economies, it is of interest to see whether there are significant differences in net employment 
growth between the two sectors that lead to a shrinking of the manufacturing sector and an 
expansion of the non-manufacturing sector as a move in the direction of a market economy 
would suggest. Of particular interest in this context is whether job creation or job destruction is 
the driving force behind this possibly different net employment growth.   
The data that we use have information on ownership types of firms, i.e. we can distinguish 
between new private, privatised and state-owned enterprises. This allows us to contribute to the 
ongoing debate about the effects of ownership on employment growth. Many papers have  
                                                                                                                                                             
the government, which does not bode well for the future.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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indicated that the employment adjustment in terms of gross flows of jobs is not very different 
between privatised and state-owned enterprises, but that most of the dynamics emerges from the 
new private firms.
3 
The third and most innovative contribution of this paper is the exploration of the link 
between the exposure of Ukrainian manufacturing industries to foreign trade and employment 
adjustment by firms operating in these industries. One strand of the Western literature on gross 
job flows considers the link between foreign trade and job creation and destruction tying it in 
with the debate on the effects of globalisation on employment in the domestic labour market. For 
example, Levinsohn (1999) explores the effects of trade liberalisation on the Chilean labour 
market and finds that size and macro effects overwhelm any trade effects. Once size and macro 
shocks are controlled for, export-led, import-competing and non-traded sectors have similar 
employment patterns.  Klein, Schuh and Triest (2002) identify trade-related adjustment costs by 
estimating the effects of real exchange rates on labour reallocation using detailed data on U.S. 
manufacturing industries for the years 1973 through 1993.   
In a transition context, the effects of trade on job reallocation have been overlooked, even 
though the rapid opening up of transition economies to world markets seems to come close to a 
natural experiment. Trade ties of Ukrainian manufacturing sectors with Western (European 
Union) markets were virtually non-existent before independence, but developed rapidly since 
then. Some sectors, however, developed strong links with Western markets in the nineties while 
other sectors remained relatively closed. We exploit these differences to investigate how the 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 “Traditional” firms are firms that already existed in Soviet times, so new private firms are excluded from their 
analysis. 
3 E.g. Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer (1996); Bilsen and Konings (1998); Acquisti and Lehmann (2000) and 
Richter and Schaffer (1996).  In contrast, Konings and Lehmann (2002) find different employment adjustment of 
privatised and state-owned Russian firms. 
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relative openness of a sector, in which a firm operates, impacts upon the creation and destruction 
of jobs in this firm. We also investigate how relative openness affects gross job flows at the two-
digit sector level.      
In the next section we describe the various data sets employed in the analysis of job gross 
flows and provide a brief review of the job flow measures. The subsequent section looks at 
foreign trade flows of Ukrainian manufacturing over the nineties and presents and discusses the 
construction of indices of relative openness at the sector level. Section four reports gross flows of 
jobs for the entire economy, for different sectors in the economy and ownership categories. It 
also discusses these flows according to employment size categories and to the relative openness 
of the sector where firms are active. In section five we report regression estimates of the 
determination of employment growth and job reallocation at the firm level as well as estimates of 
the impact of relative openness on job flows at the sector level. The final section summarises our 
main findings. 
II. Data and job flow measures  
  We use two firm/establishment-level data sets in our work. The first data set covers 7,303 
“traditional” establishments in manufacturing between 1996 and 2000, of which 6189 have 
positive employment levels in all years. This data on the manufacturing sector is provided by the 
Government Statistical Committee (“Derzhkomstat”) and covers virtually the entire population 
of those manufacturing establishments that already existed in Soviet times, allowing one to study 
the evolution of job flows over time for the “traditional” manufacturing sector, which as stated 
above excludes new private firms.
4  The use of this data set is twofold. First, as a check of 
                                                 
4 This has been done in the above-mentioned comparative study of Brown and Earle (2002b). They convincingly 
show that new private firms do not enter the Derzhkomstat “register” of manufacturing establishments. Note that the 
survey procedures of the Russian and Ukrainian statistical offices, like in Soviet times, still stipulate the collection 
of employment information from establishments.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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whether the job flow measures generated from the second data source are reasonable, and 
secondly, we use information on employment as an important building block for our relative 
openness indices.  
The second data set is based on annual company accounts data of 2,239 Ukrainian firms 
in both the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing sectors, where we have annual 
observations for the years 1998-2000. These data are retrieved from the Amadeus data base 
compiled by Bureau Van Dijck, a commercial data provider. The Amadeus data base consists 
mostly of company accounts data of European Union firms, however, it also reports information 
on some countries in Central and Eastern Europe. To be included in the data base at least one of 
the following criteria has to be fulfilled: operating revenue must be at least 1.5 million Euro, total 
assets must be at least 3 million Euro or the number of employees has to be larger than 15. These 
restrictions on the data imply that micro firms are not included. Nevertheless, a substantial 
number of medium and small firms enters the data. Abstracting from micro firms, the data is 
assumed to be a random sample of the population of firms and enables us to infer some basic 
patterns of job reallocation in Ukraine. The manufacturing sample covers roughly one third of all 
employment in manufacturing, while the data from non-manufacturing sectors comprise about 
9% of total non-manufacturing employment over this period. 
The Amadeus data set includes the company names of all firms and based on this 
information it is possible to determine that the data overwhelmingly relate to establishments. 
Only 2% of firms in the overall sample have more than one plant in the reported period, although 
there are three very large firms in the non-manufacturing sample.
5  The information on company 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
5 These firms are Ukrainian Telekom, Lviv-Railways and Odessa-Railways.  Throughout the rest of the paper we 
use the terms firm and establishment interchangeably. 
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names also allows us to match ownership information of each firm from an external source. 
Consequently, we are able to identify new private firms, privatised firms and state-owned 
enterprises.   
The data set that we use in the analysis comprises only firms that we can identify with 
certainty as continuing firms, i.e. firms that have positive employment levels in all years.     
While the Amadeus data set has the advantage that it includes new private firms and 
firms in the non-manufacturing sector, it is restricted to the years 1998-2000. These are, 
however, the years when the Ukrainian economy started to emerge from nearly a decade of 
decline and stagnation as discussed previously. In addition, throughout this stagnation period 
forced unpaid leave was a very widespread practice of Ukrainian firms, generating potentially 
large biases in job flow measures. At the end of the nineties the incidence of forced unpaid leave 
was dramatically reduced, attenuating biases arising from this source of measurement error.
6 
Table 1 gives some summary statistics of the Amadeus data set for the years 1999 and 
2000. From the table it is clear that Ukrainian firms on average are still very large compared to 
the typical Western firms. Furthermore, not surprisingly for transition economies, the average 
firm is larger in the manufacturing sector than in the non-manufacturing sector. But even in the 
non-manufacturing sector the average firm size is quite large compared to Western standards, as 
the benchmark figures for Belgium and the UK in Table 1, taken from the Amadeus data base, 
show.     
We can also note that the average employment growth rates in the sample are negative in 
both sectors, with average employment contraction in the manufacturing sector being larger in 
absolute value in both years.   
                                                 
6 For a more detailed discussion of measurement error connected to forced unpaid leave, see Konings, Kupets and 
Lehmann (2002). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992, 1999) gross job creation (pos) is defined as the 
sum of all employment gains in all expanding firms, while gross job destruction (neg) is the sum 
of all employment losses in all contracting firms in an economy or sector. Usually gross job 
destruction is expressed as a positive number. These gross job flows can be expressed as rates by 
dividing them by the total amount of jobs available in an economy or sector. The sum of the 
gross job creation rate and the gross job destruction rate is the gross job reallocation rate (gross), 
while the difference is the net aggregate employment growth rate (net) that can be observed in 
aggregate statistics. A measure of churning or reallocation of jobs which is over and above the 
amount of job reallocation necessary to accommodate a given net aggregate employment growth 
rate is the excess job reallocation rate (excess) and is defined as the gross job reallocation rate 
minus the modulus of the net aggregate employment growth rate. We interpret excess as a 
measure of genuine labour reallocation within a sector. 
The shares of job creation and destruction of specific sectors or categories of firms are 
given by the ratio of the number of created or destroyed jobs of these sectors/categories of firms 
over the number of all created or destroyed jobs. These shares establish the absolute contribution 
of sectors/categories to job creation or job destruction, but comparisons of job flow shares with 
employment size shares also give insights into their relative contributions.   
The one-year persistence rate of job creation is the fraction of jobs created in year t that 
remain filled at the sampling date one year later. The one-year persistence rate of job destruction 
is the fraction of jobs that do not reappear at the sampling date one year later (Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1999). These persistence rates document whether the observed job flows are of a 
temporary or more permanent nature, an issue of particular relevance in the transition context. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
  10
Because the Amadeus data are not census-type data, the presented job flow rates are 
estimates and it is, therefore, important to establish the precision of these estimates by providing 
standard errors. One way to generate these standard errors, which is computer-intensive but 
computationally simple, is bootstrapping.
7 Under the assumption that the sample is random this 
is a legitimate procedure, which thus far has been used seldom in the literature on gross job flows 
in transition economies even when small random samples were analysed instead of census-type 
data.  
III. Trade flows and the relative openness of manufacturing sectors 
We use the changing trade patterns of the Ukrainian manufacturing sectors to investigate 
how the opening up of an economy to world markets affects employment adjustment at the firm 
and sector level. We, therefore, first discuss these changing trade patterns and then describe the 
construction of indices that attempt to capture this opening up of an economy.  
We have two sets of trade data available in our work. The Ukrainian State Customs 
Committee provides trade data by country of origin and destination for product groups using a 
Derzhkomstat classification.
8 We mapped these groups to NACE2 commodity groups at the two-
digit level. From an external source we are also able to match the value of imports and exports at 
the firm level into our Amadeus data set.    
The large increase in trade flows to and from Western countries that Ukrainian 
manufacturing sectors have experienced since independence can be inferred from figures 2-4, 
which show annual total trade, import and export flows to and from three geographic areas, the 
world as a whole, the European Union (EU) and the CIS for the years 1994-2001. The presented 
                                                 
7 Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) present alternative ways to compute standard errors of job flow rates, 
requiring knowledge of sampling weights. 
 
8 We refer to these data as customs house data. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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flows are restricted to those sectors, which are included in the Amadeus data set, and are based 
on Ukrainian customs house data, only available since 1994.  Figures 2-4 and tables A1 and A2 
in the appendix show several noteworthy trends. First, trade to and from the world at large has 
risen between 1994 and 2001 by roughly two thirds, with a particular steep rise of EU trade (by 
ca. 300%), while CIS trade has been slightly declining. As a consequence the share of EU trade 
has roughly doubled in this period and the CIS share has been more than halved. Secondly, while 
imports from the EU increased dramatically, the rise in exports to the EU is spectacular, 
exceeding the growth in imports by nearly 100 percentage points.  However, most of this growth 
occurred in the last three years of the reported period. Thirdly, the EU trade flow levels in 1994 
are low, and we moot that at the beginning of transition they were close to zero. This inference 
seems especially valid for export flows (Figure 4). 
Using the trade data at the sector level we first construct the following index of the 
relative openness of a sector in the spirit of Klein, Schuh and Triest (2002): 
 
Open(total)j,t = 
[(Importj,t + Exportj,t)/(Importtot,t + Exporttot,t)]/(employmentj,96 / employmenttot,96). 
 
The index gives the relative share of imports and exports, i.e. of total trade flows, of sector j in 
year t, weighted by its employment share in 1996. As no reliable data on employment at the 
sector level are available, the employment levels are aggregates derived from the Derzhkomstat 
data on manufacturing establishments.
9 We employ a smoothed version of this index, taking 
                                                 
9 Employment is a measure of economic activity, which is far from perfect in the Ukrainian context given the 
amount of forced unpaid leave. However, under the assumption of roughly proportional incidence of unpaid leave 
across manufacturing sectors, the calculated employment shares do provide reliable relative weights of economic 
activity. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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averages over the years 1996-1998, so that any short-run shocks, e.g. terms of trade shocks, are 
averaged out. Averaging over the indicated years generates an index, which is exogenous to the 
analysed gross job flows of the years 1999 and 2000. This index is calculated for world, EU and 
CIS trade flows.  
For the first two trading areas, and especially for the EU area, the index tries to measure 
the relative degree, with which a respective sector in manufacturing industry has opened up to 
the world economy.
10  Assuming that at the beginning of transition EU trade flows of Ukrainian 
manufacturing were close to zero, the relative level of a sector averaged over the years 1996-
1998 tells us the relative change of this sector, i.e. it proxies for the relative speed, with which a 
sector has established ties with Western markets. The index can, therefore, be used to investigate 
how relative openness of a sector affects employment adjustment at the firm and sector level.       
Ukraine as part of the former Soviet Union has trade flows to and from countries within 
the CIS (mainly Russia) that were, of course, intra-country flows of goods before independence. 
A high relative level in CIS trade flows of a sector in manufacturing might reflect the re-
establishment of previously existing trade links between enterprises, i.e. the attenuation of the 
problems of “disorganisation” discussed for example in Blanchard and Kremer (1997), Roland 
and Verdier (1999) and Konings and Walsh (1999a), or it might represent a genuine opening up 
of this sector to competition within CIS economies.  
We are not able to identify these alternative scenarios with the data at our disposal. The 
firm-level import data cover only that part of firms’ input requirements originating from outside 
Ukraine. Aggregating firm-level imports up to two-digit sector levels and using these aggregates 
to construct an index of relative import intensity along the lines of the above index will not 
                                                 
10 An index measuring the absolute level of openness of a sector employed by Klein, Schuh and Triest (2002) might 
be preferable but requires reliable data on production, unavailable in the Ukrainian case. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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necessarily say much about how well a sector has re-established supply chains. Some sectors 
might rely predominantly on suppliers from within Ukraine and some sectors on suppliers from 
other CIS countries. Employing the customs house data, we simply investigate whether CIS trade 
flows result in different employment adjustment by firms and sectors than world and EU trade 
flows.  
In order to get additional insights in how trade affects employment growth and job 
reallocation, we also construct the indices of relative openness separating the information on 
import and export flows: 
 
Open(import)j,t = (Importj,t)/(Importtot,t)/(employmentj,96 / employmenttot,96) ; 
 
Open(export)j,t = (Exportj,t/Exporttot,t)/(employmentj,96 / employmenttot,96), 
where the indices have a similar interpretation as the index based on total trade flows. Summary 
statistics of the various indices, based on the 26 manufacturing sectors in the Amadeus data set, 
are given in table A3.  The figures of the index based on EU-exports are particularly striking, 
pointing to a large number of sectors that are very little engaged in exports to the EU area, and to 
a small number of sectors that are very strongly involved in export activities to the EU.  The five 
most open sectors as far as EU exports are concerned are (in descending order): recycling; 
manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel; manufacture of wearing 
apparel; manufacture of fabricated metal products; manufacture of leather and leather products.   
One reason for developing indices based on imports and exports separately is that sectors 
that are particularly open to imports might not be especially export intensive. This conjecture is 
in part confirmed in Table A4, where Spearman rank correlation coefficients are shown for the 
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various indices.  The high and significant coefficient of the import and export indices for the CIS 
trading area and the low and insignificant coefficient of the same indices for the EU trading area 
imply that sectors that are import intensive are also export intensive as far as trade with the CIS 
is concerned, while those sectors that are more exposed to import competition from EU countries 
are not the sectors that rank high in exports to this trade area.   
Both the import- and the export-based indices proxy for a varying degree of product 
market competition in either domestic markets or markets abroad, since          the customs house 
data, from which they are derived, relate to products groups and not inputs required by 
industries.
11 Increased competitive pressure is associated in the literature with firm behaviour 
that leads to productivity gains, to continuous improvements in product quality and stable or 
expanding market shares.
12 Thus competitive pressure might positively affect employment 
growth and job turnover at the firm level. This latter result can come about because firms in 
sectors faced with external competition have more incentives for constant productivity increases, 
and consequently have high turnover of employees. Whether import competition and competition 
in export markets lead to similar employment policies by firms is, however, not entirely clear 
and worth investigating. One noteworthy and obvious difference between import competition 
and competition in export markets is that all firms in a sector experiencing strong import 
competition face the competitive pressure, while only those firms in a strongly export-oriented 
sector that actually export are exposed to such pressure. Bernard et al. (2003) for example show 
that U.S. establishments being confronted with this pressure are more efficient than other 
                                                 
11 In other words, the data do not relate to imports by an industry, but imports of goods, which this industry 
produces. Also note that we do not have trade data on intermediate and final goods, so it is hard to disentangle 
whether Ukrainian firms are genuinely exposed to competition in export markets or whether they are mainly 
involved in transfer pricing activities.  
  
12 Repkine and Walsh (1999) discuss these issues in the context of transition. 
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establishments in the same sector. We take account of this difference in the firm-level 
regressions by interacting the relative openness index, which is based on exports, with a dummy 
if the firm is observed to have exports in the years 1996-1998. Before we turn to these 
regressions we present some basic patterns of job creation and job destruction in the years 1999 
and 2000.       
IV. Basic Patterns of Job Creation and Destruction in Ukraine 
 
  Table 2 presents the distributions of employment growth rates
13 for various years using 
both the Amadeus and the Derzhkomstat data sets. The Amadeus-based distributions for 
manufacturing are calculated for all firms and for “traditional” firms, i.e. without new private 
firms.  For both 1999 and 2000 the mean growth rates are negative in the overall sample of the 
Amadeus data as in the sub-samples of manufacturing and non-manufacturing. The same holds 
for the four years of the growth rates derived from the Derzhkomstat data. For all years and both 
data sets, we observe a zero growth rate at the 75 percentile. This implies that slightly less than 
three quarters of all firms destroy jobs, while roughly one quarter creates jobs in each year. The 
mean growth rates of the overall sample of the Amadeus data set are in both years with –0.061 
and –0.062 smaller than the (negative) growth rates implied by the employment levels in Figure 
1, which amount roughly to –0.02. The lack of micro firms in the Amadeus data set might 
explain some of this discrepancy since these firms might contribute to job creation in a 
particularly strong fashion.   
  The distributions of employment growth based on the Derzhkomstat data are relatively 
compressed in the first three years for which we have data, in the year 2000 the distribution 
                                                 
13 Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and most subsequent research on job flows measure the employment growth rate as 
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becomes more dispersed as shown in the increase of the standard deviation. We see a similar 
jump in the standard deviation between 1999 and 2000 with the Amadeus-based “traditional” 
manufacturing firms. In the case of the latter, the wider distribution is mainly brought about 
because of higher levels of labour shedding by some firms, since at the 5 percentile, for example, 
the growth rate falls from –0.293 to –0.475. We see a similar pattern of higher levels of labour 
shedding in the Derzhkomstat-based distributions. In non-manufacturing, the wider distribution 
is a result of both more labour shedding and of an increase in employment expansion by some 
firms. At the 5th percentile we see a decrease in the growth rate from  -0.404 to –0.598 and an 
increase at the 95th percentile from 0.436 to 0.554 over the two years. Heterogeneity in 
employment behaviour clearly increased in the year 2000 in this sector.        
  Inspection of the Amadeus-based distributions of all manufacturing and of “traditional” 
manufacturing firms leads us to conclude that the large majority of new private firms is 
expanding employment in both years; up to the 75 percentile the two distributions are virtually 
identical, while we find lower growth rates throughout the upper tail of the “traditional” 
manufacturing distributions. Also, the latter distributions are roughly in line with the 
Derzhkomstat-based distributions for the years 1999 and 2000.     
Most of the job flow rates that we present are estimates based on the Amadeus data set. 
Only Table 5 shows job flow measures of manufacturing based on the census-type Derzhkomstat 
data. In all the tables that are based on the Amadeus data bootstrapped standard errors of the job 
flow measures are reported. These standard errors, which are based on 1000 repetitions, allow us 
to establish the precision of the estimates. Using various distributional assumptions, this enables 
us to construct confidence intervals and to thus compare job flow rates across categories in a 
statistically meaningful way. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals of the job flow measures William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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are similar whether one imposes a normal distribution or uses the percentile method.
14 For the 
purposes of the paper it suffices to double the shown standard error to get a satisfactory 
approximation of half of the width of the confidence interval.  
Table 3 presents estimates of the job flow rates using the overall sample of the Amadeus 
data set. Table 4 shows estimates of these rates and of gross job flow shares and size shares after 
the data set has been split into manufacturing and non-manufacturing. While job destruction 
dominates job creation in the Ukrainian economy in both years, job creation rises and job 
destruction falls in 2000 compared with 1999. As already stated, heterogeneity in employment 
behaviour increased in 2000 as shown by the doubling of the excess job reallocation rate. In 
addition, given the bootstrapping procedure, the increase in the bootstrap standard errors from 
1999 to 2000 for all job flow measures apart from the job destruction rate tells us that job 
creation has become more heterogeneous in 2000 and not job destruction.
15  
The manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors have very similar job flow measures 
in 1999. In the year 2000, on the other hand, there seem to be clear differences between the two 
sectors of the economy, as job creation is more than double in the non-manufacturing sector. We 
can, however, also see that the rise in heterogeneous employment behaviour in 2000 can be 
mainly attributed to the non-manufacturing sector, which makes the estimates in this sector much 
more imprecise than in manufacturing. The large standard error in the job creation rate does not 
allow us to unequivocally say that non-manufacturing has a larger job creation in the year 2000 
                                                 
14For a discussion of how to construct confidence intervals from bootstrapped standard errors, see Efron and 
Tibshirani (1993). The confidence intervals are not presented but are available on request.  
 
15Pos and neg are the two job flow measures from which the other three measures are derived. The bootstrapping 
procedure treats the sample as a population and draws 1000 random samples with replacement, then calculates the 
mean and the standard deviation of the job flow measure in question. This standard deviation is then the 
bootstrapped standard error. If there is more variation in e.g. job creation than in job destruction, this will show up 
as a larger standard deviation of the first job flow measure. In other words, very precise estimates hint at uniform 
behaviour across the sampled firms, while imprecise estimates hint at heterogeneous behaviour. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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than manufacturing. We infer, however, that non-manufacturing contributes disproportionately to 
job creation in both years, while its destruction shares are only marginally higher than its size 
shares.  
The estimates of the job flow rates of the manufacturing sector are clearly more precise. 
It is, therefore, noteworthy that the 95% confidence intervals of all job flow rates but one in 
“traditional“ manufacturing given in Table 4 include the values in Table 5, where we report the 
same measures using Derzhkomstat census data.   
The empirical evidence on gross job flows in manufacturing in other transition countries 
generally shows low creation, high destruction and low excess reallocation rates in the early 
phase of transition. For example, Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002) report a job creation rate of 
3.1% and a job destruction rate of 8.3% for the early period of transition in Estonia. Konings, 
Lehmann and Schaffer (1996) present a job creation of 0.6% and a job destruction rate of 16.5% 
for Polish state-owned manufacturing firms in 1990 and 1991. Brown and Earle (2002b) show a 
similar relationship between job creation and destruction in the “traditional” Russian 
manufacturing sector in the early reform period (1992-1996), with an average job creation rate of 
2.1% and an average job destruction rate of 11.2%.
16 Evidence on job flows for all sectors points 
to less dominance of job destruction and, therefore, higher excess reallocation rates. The latter 
rates reach Western levels especially in later stages of transition. For example, Faggio and 
Konings (2001) report job creation and destruction rates of 4.3% and 5.2% respectively, for all 
sectors in Slovenia in the years 1994-1997, implying an excess reallocation rate of 8.6%. Using a 
different data base, Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2003) establish job creation and destruction 
rates of 10.1% and 9.2% for all Slovenian sectors at the end of the nineties, implying an excess 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
16 The implied excess job reallocation rates for the three countries are 6.3%, 1.7% and 4.2% respectively.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
  19
reallocation rate of 18.4%. In light of these numbers, job reallocation in Ukraine, relatively low 
in 1999, was certainly comparable to job reallocation in other transition economies in the year 
2000. The 18.4% excess job reallocation rate of the non-manufacturing sector points to a 
particularly impressive amount of job reallocation for this year. While the estimated job flow 
rates for Ukraine seem to point to a clear hiatus between the nineties and the year 2000
17, 
unfortunately we cannot know from one data point whether the better performance of the year 
2000 in terms of job reallocation is a temporary “blip” or the beginning of a sustained trend.        
The one-year persistence rates of annual job flows in Table 6 clearly demonstrate that 
these flows are not of a temporary nature. Roughly 80% of jobs created in 1999 are still there 
one year later, and about 90% of all jobs destroyed in 1999 do not reappear in 2000. Both these 
rates are roughly 10 percentage points higher than those presented for the U.S. by Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1999).  Different persistence patterns emerge in the two sectors of the economy. 
Job creation and destruction persistence are equal and roughly 85% in manufacturing, while in 
non-manufacturing the destruction persistence is with 92% roughly 20 percentage points higher 
than the persistence of new jobs. Surprisingly the non-manufacturing sector has the higher 
destruction persistence.  
Behind the aggregate job flow figures tremendous heterogeneous behaviour in job 
reallocation within sectors occurs as the decomposition of the excess job reallocation at the 2-
digit level in Table 7 shows. Like in Western economies a large majority of job shifts takes place 
within sectors. However, in 2000 between sector job shifts reach one third of all job shifts, which 
is a very large fraction in international perspective.   
                                                                                                                                                             
  
17 This hiatus is also visible in the figures presented by Brown and Earle (2002b). 
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Cross-tabulated evidence on firm size and job flows reported in Konings, Kupets and 
Lehmann (2002) gives a somewhat inconsistent picture and is not presented here for brevity.  
However, small firms in Ukraine seem to contribute more to job creation than we observe in 
Western economies. But this size effect could be closely connected to firm age or ownership 
type: young firms and new private firms tend to have small employment levels. While there is 
unfortunately no reliable information on the age of the firm, we can condition on ownership type 
and see whether the size effect is partially explained by composition effects.  
Table 8 presents the five job flow measures and the three share statistics disaggregated by 
three ownership types, i.e. privatised, new private and state-owned firms. There are striking 
differences with respect to job creation between new private firms and privatised and state-
owned firms. New private firms are much more dynamic as far as job creation is concerned, 
leading to positive employment growth in both years. We also observe more heterogeneity in the 
employment behaviour of new private firms as shown by the much higher excess job reallocation 
rate in both years. In particular privatised firms but also state-owned ones predominantly destroy 
jobs, while new private firms both create and destroy jobs, a finding that was also established for 
the Russian economy (Acquisti and Lehmann, 2000). The good job creation performance of new 
private firms in both years could imply that there is a genuine ownership type effect at work or a 
size effect.  Below we will try to disentangle these size and ownership effects properly within a 
regression framework.              
New private firms contribute a disproportionately large amount of jobs to the pool of new 
jobs, while their contribution to job destruction corresponds roughly to their employment share. 
The difference between state-owned firms and privatised firms on these measures is striking. 
Relative to their employment share privatised firms create smaller amounts of new jobs and William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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destroy more jobs than do state-owned firms.  The figures on job creation shares also clearly 
show that because of their large employment base both privatised and state-owned firms still 
contribute the lion’s share of created jobs in the Ukrainian economy in the reported period.  
Cross tabulations of groups of sectors categorised according to a certain relative level of 
openness and their job flows, based on the different indices and trade areas, do not exhibit any 
statistically significant differences and are not shown here.
18 Regression analysis seems to be 
more appropriate to shed light on the impact of relative openness on firm level and sector level 
employment adjustment.   
V. Evidence from Firm Level and Sector Level Regressions 
  The gross job flow rates that we documented in the last section are linked to the individual 
firm’s employment decision. Factors that influence firm level employment will most likely also 
shape the pattern of gross job flows in the aggregate. We, therefore, initially explore in this 
section which factors drive firm level employment decisions. This may allow us to disentangle, 
for instance, the effects of ownership and size to establish the importance of ownership for the 
job generation process. In addition, the relationship between the relative openness of a sector, in 
which a firm operates, and the firm’s employment growth and job reallocation can be 
investigated, holding factors like size and ownership type constant.  
  First, an employment growth equation for the years 1999 and 2000 of the following form is 
estimated:  
   git = β0 + β1ln(size)it + β2newprivatei + β3privatisedi + β4∑jI(ij)open(x)j + ∑jδijinddumj + 
∑tγtλt + εit             ( 1 ) ,  
                                                 
18 We split sectors into three groups; those with low relative openness, belonging to the lower third of the 
distribution of the index, those with medium relative openness and those with high relative openness, belonging to 
the medium and upper thirds of the distribution of the index respectively. The cross tabulations based on the three 
indices and the three trading areas are available upon request.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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where size is average contemporaneous size, in order to avoid the regression-to-the-mean fallacy. 
The variable open is the relative openness index averaged over the years 1996-1998 , with the 
argument x equal to total, import or export. The variables newprivate and privatised  are 
ownership dummies, while inddum is an industry dummy and λt  is a year dummy. The indicator 
variable I(ij) takes the value one when firm i is in industry j. The error term is heteroscedastic 
and includes unobserved factors, which are assumed to be similar for each firm across the years, 
i.e. the εit’s are assumed clustered for each i.   However, since ownership changes in the sampled 
firms occurred no later than 1996 and since we have taken the average of the openness index 
over the years 1996-1998, the ownership dummies and the openness index are by construction 
not correlated with the error term. We also follow the firm growth literature in assuming that 
average size is weakly exogeneous. Consequently, as long as this latter assumption holds and as 
long as we correct for the heteroscedastic and clustered nature of the error term, equation (1) is 
consistently estimated with OLS. 
  In the case of the openness index being based on exports we extend equation (1) by 
additionally interacting the index with a dummy variable when firm i had positive levels of 
exports in the years 1996-1998. This allows us to test the hypothesis that firms in an export 
intensive sector that export have different employment adjustment from firms that do not. We 
also experimented with more complex specifications, allowing for interactions of size with 
ownership types and relative openness. These interactive terms were however jointly 
insignificant.
19  
                                                 
19 These regressions are available upon request. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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  A second estimation concerns the determination of firm level job reallocation.  We employ 
the same right-hand-side variables as in equation (1), but replace the dependent variable by the 
modulus of the growth rate.    
  Finally, in order to establish whether a sector’s relative openness affects its job flows we 
estimate models of the following form, pooling data over 1999 and 2000: 
 
Job_Flowj = α0 + α1median_sizej + α2new_private_sharej + α3privatised_sharej +  
α4open(x)j    +   ∑tγtλt + εjt                     (2), 
 
where Job_Flowj = {posj, negj, netj, grossj, excessj}, median_sizej is the median size of firms in 
sector j,  new_private_sharej is the share of new private firms in sector j, privatised_sharej is the 
share of privatised firms in sector j and openness(x)j and λt denote the same as in equation (1). 
The error term is heteroscedastic and clustered across years. Again, we assume the right-hand-
side variables to be strictly or weakly exogeneous, rendering OLS estimation of the various 
models based on equation (2) consistent.  
  Turning to the evidence, the negative relationship between firm size and gross flows of jobs is 
confirmed for firm level employment flows in the case of non-weighted regressions with respect 
to the entire sample and non-manufacturing as columns 1 and 3 in Table 9a show. When we 
weigh these regressions by employment, this negative effect is attenuated (columns 2 and 4) 
implying that some large firms contribute disproportionately to employment growth. The 
influence of these larger firms can also bee seen with respect to manufacturing where an 
insignificant correlation of size and growth turns into a small positive size effect when 
employment weights are added to the regression (cf. columns 5 and 6). Since the correlation of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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size and growth is different for manufacturing and non-manufacturing, firm size alone is an 
important factor that can explain differences in turbulence or gross flows of jobs between the two 
sectors.    
  Controlling for size, new private firms have much higher growth rates than firms in the other 
two ownership classes, state-owned and privatised firms. While survival bias might play a role 
here, work on firm level growth equations done for market economies and emerging economies 
has established that much of potential selection bias is eliminated by including size of the firm in 
the regression (e.g. Evans, 1987; Konings and Xavier, 2001). While new private firms have 
higher average growth rates in the manufacturing sector than in the non-manufacturing sector, it 
is also noteworthy that privatised firms have the same employment growth as have state-owned 
firms. Such a finding was established by Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer (1996) for Polish 
manufacturing and by Richter and Schaffer (1996) for Russian manufacturing at the start of 
transition. In contrast, Brown and Earle (2002a) find a small positive effect of privatisation on 
employment growth in the Russian manufacturing sector. Our result would suggest that in 
Ukraine privatisation has thus far had little effect on the employment behaviour of firms.   
  Tables 9b and 9c investigate the impact of relative openness of a sector in manufacturing on 
firm level employment growth.
20 The results of Table 9b use relative openness indices calculated 
on the basis of total trade flows and imports. They show a strong positive effect of the relative 
openness of a sector, in which a firm operates, on employment growth of this firm. If we 
understand a higher relative openness index based on imports as increased import competition, 
then our results state that firms, which have been operating in sectors with more import 
competition, exhibit more employment growth. Table 9c gives estimates that use relative 
                                                 
20 Since the differences between non-weighted and weighted regressions are miniscule, we only report the non-
weighted regressions here. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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openness indices based on exports. Several important points emerge from these results. First, we 
observe a positive impact of relative openness on employment growth for world exports and 
exports to the EU area, while exports to the CIS do not seem to affect firm level employment 
growth. Secondly, only those firms that actually export to the world and the EU experience 
higher employment growth when they are located in a relatively export intensive sector: the 
coefficient on the relative openness index turns insignificant when we add an interactive term, 
which links relative openness with the incidence of firm level exports.  Finally, this interactive 
term reduces the effect of the new private dummy, implying that part of the good growth 
performance of new private firms can be attributed to their operation in export markets. 
  The quintessence of this evidence seems to be that competitive pressure, whether brought on 
by import competition or competition in export markets leads to better firm performance in 
product markets and enhanced efficiency resulting in larger employment growth. The results also 
suggest that firms operating in export markets of the CIS might not be exposed to the same 
competitive pressures as firms operating in export markets in the world at large and in the EU.         
  The firm level job reallocation regressions in Table 10a show that smaller firms engage in 
more job reallocation, as do new private firms in the manufacturing sector. Table 10b, on the 
other hand, establishes that import competition originating from the world at large and EU 
countries lowers job reallocation of manufacturing firms. Competition in exports markets in the 
EU also lowers firm level job reallocation as the last column of Table 10c highlights. The result 
that firms experiencing more competitive pressures engage in less job reallocation is somewhat 
unexpected. One can moot that those firms in Ukraine, which for some time have been exposed 
to more competitive pressures, have their main job reallocation efforts already behind them in William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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1999 and 2000. As this explanation is not entirely satisfactory, we turn to sector level regressions 
where we can directly investigate the impact of a sector’s relative openness on its job flows.  
  Table 11, which displays coefficients on the openness index for the five sector level job flow 
rates, reveals some interesting patterns. If we take the world and the EU as trading areas, export 
flows seem to be much more important in the determination of sector level employment 
adjustment than import flows. Sectors, which are more export intensive, create more and destroy 
less jobs leading to increased employment growth.   In contrast, sectors being exposed to strong 
import competition from the CIS destroy less jobs and also engage in less job reallocation than 
sectors with weaker import competition from this trading area.  The significant positive impact 
on the excess job reallocation rate in column eight tells us that sectors with relatively strong 
export links to the EU genuinely reallocate more jobs than sectors lacking these links. On the 
other hand, sectors experiencing strong import competition from the EU exhibit lower genuine 
job reallocation, as the negative entry for the excess job reallocation rate in column nine shows. 
So, more product market competition in EU export markets seems to increase job turbulence at 
the sector level, while increased import competition from EU products seems to decrease it. It is 
finally noteworthy that stronger links with the world and CIS trading areas have no impact on the 
excess job reallocation rate.           
VI. Conclusions 
This paper documents and analyses gross job flows and their determinants in Ukraine, using 
a data set of more than 2200 Ukrainian firms operating in manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
in the years 1998-2000. 
There are several important findings in the paper. First, job destruction is dominating job 
creation in both 1999 and 2000, with destruction rates of 11% in 1999 and of 8% in 2000, while William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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the creation rates are 3% and 6% respectively. This result in conjunction with the arguments put 
forth by Aslund (2002) leads us to believe that the Ukrainian economy is still at an early phase of 
transition. A very clear-cut result is the strong positive effect of new private firms on net 
employment growth, a finding established for other transition economies as well. At the same 
time, we do not find differences in the employment growth of state-owned and privatised firms. 
We also observe an inverse relationship between size of a firm and net employment growth at the 
firm level in non-manufacturing. An inverse correlation between size and the firm-level 
reallocation rate is, however, present in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing.   
In manufacturing, the relative openness of a sector, in which a firm operates, is an important 
factor of firm level employment adjustment, whether we look at total trade flows, import flows 
or export flows. Firms exposed to more import competition have superior employment growth, 
whether this competition arises from imports from the world at large, from the CIS or from the 
EU.  In contrast, only firms that export to the world at large and the EU and are located in more 
export intensive sectors have faster employment growth. We also find that job reallocation is 
lower for firms that are experiencing either strong import competition or competitive pressures in 
export markets. This result only holds for firms engaged in world and EU trade.  It might be 
attributed to the fact that firms, which have operated in a more competitive environment for 
some time, require less reshuffling of jobs in the reported period than those firms with less 
competitive pressures in the past.   
The final set of results deals with the impact of the relative openness of a sector on its gross 
job flows.  These results are also divided along geographic lines. For world and EU trade export 
intensive sectors create more jobs and destroy less, while sectors that strongly compete with 
imports from the CIS destroy less jobs, but have no increased job creation. Sectors with strong William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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export links to the EU also show higher excess job reallocation rates, i.e. exhibit increased 
genuine job reallocation, while sectors confronted with strong competition from EU imports 
actually show lower genuine job turnover.  
While trade flows are clearly important in explaining employment adjustment of Ukrainian 
manufacturing firms and sectors, the presented results are of an exploratory nature given the 
limited data at hand. More work with time series data is required to better understand these 
results. Future work needs to understand in particular why strong trade links with the world at 
large and especially with the EU impose discipline on firms and sectors, which seems 
substantially weaker when it comes to trade flows with the CIS.     William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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Figure 1 – GDP, Employment and Real Wage Dynamics in Ukraine: 1990 - 2000 
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Source: Ukrainian Statistical Office – Derzhkomstat; TACIS. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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Figure 2 – Total Trade Flows of Manufacturing Sector in Ukraine, 1994-2001 
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Source: Ukrainian State Customs Committee. Only sectors used in the manufacturing sample of the Amadeus data 
set are included. 
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Figure 3 – Import Flows of Manufacturing Sector in Ukraine, 1994-2001 
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Figure 4 – Export Flows of Manufacturing Sector in Ukraine, 1994-2001 
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics of Amadeus Firms  
  number of firms mean 
employment 
mean employment 
growth 
Year  1999  2000 1999  2000 1999 2000 
Overall sample  2239  2239 968 
(3745) 
947 
(3928) 
-0.061 
(0.25) 
-0.062 
(0.31) 
Manufacturing 1259  1259 1098 
(2521) 
1063 
(2708) 
-0.065 
(0.22) 
-0.073 
(0.25) 
non-manufacturing 980  980  800 
(4883) 
798 
(5081) 
-0.055 
(0.30) 
-0.048 
(0.37) 
Manufacturing
a) 15228
a)   37
a)     
non-manufacturing
a) 3665
a)  133
a)     
Manufacturing
b) 19536
b)  378
b)     
non-manufacturing
b) 13154
b)  625
b)     
Note: Standard deviation in brackets; a) averages for 1994-1999 in Belgium; b) averages for 1994-1999 in the 
United Kingdom. 
 
 
Table 2 - Distribution of Year-by-Year Employment Growth Rates 
 
Source  Year    1%  5%  10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% Mean    StDev 
Amadeus 98-99  -0.665  -0.341  -0.241 -0.158 -0.092 0.002 0.163 0.342 0.851 -0.061 0.254 
Overall sample 
n=2239  99-00 -1.013  -0.518  -0.333 -0.153 -0.040 0.025 0.137 0.315 1.137 -0.062 0.307 
Amadeus 98-99  -0.582  -0.293  -0.230 -0.155 -0.094 -0.011 0.111 0.269 0.800 -0.065 0.216 
Manufacturing 
n=1259  99-00 -0.974  -0.482  -0.308 -0.138 -0.036 0.024 0.100 0.194 0.763 -0.073 0.248 
Amadeus 
‘traditional’ 98-99  -0.582  -0.293  -0.230 -0.155 -0.096 -0.016 0.088 0.187 0.580 -0.077 0.190 
Manufacturing 
n=1213  99-00 -0.956  -0.475  -0.304 -0.138 -0.037 0.021 0.095 0.176 0.626 -0.075 0.237 
Amadeus 98-99  -0.942  -0.404  -0.262 -0.161 -0.088 0.023 0.225 0.436 0.885 -0.055 0.296 
Non-
manufacturing 
n=980  99-00 -1.122  -0.598  -0.346 -0.167 -0.044 0.028 0.240 0.554 1.376 -0.048 0.369 
Derzhkomstat 96-97  -0.621  -0.308  -0.234 -0.144 -0.070 0.000 0.061 0.126 0.475 -0.078 0.185 
Manufacturing 97-98 -0.744  -0.321  -0.229 -0.130 -0.055 0.005 0.075 0.143 0.529 -0.065 0.197 
 n=6189  98-99  -0.748 -0.339 -0.248 -0.141 -0.058 0.005 0.080 0.163 0.477 -0.072 0.196 
   99-00  -1.126 -0.537 -0.340 -0.168 -0.056 0.022 0.102 0.192 0.503 -0.098 0.264 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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Table 3 – Gross Flow Rates for Overall Sample  
 
Year pos  neg  gross  net  excess  n 
1999  0.026 0.109 0.135 -0.083 0.052 2239 
  (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006)   
2000  0.059 0.081 0.140 -0.022 0.118 2239 
  (0.017) (0.006) (0.017) (0.019) (0.028)   
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, based on 1000 repetitions; pos = job creation rate, neg = job 
destruction rate, gross = job reallocation rate, net = net employment growth rate, exc = excess job reallocation rate  
Source: Amadeus data set. 
 
 
Table 4 – Job Flow Rates and Shares by Sector: 1999 and 2000  
 
Year Sector  pos  neg  gross net  excess jcsh jdsh szsh  n 
1999 Manufacturing  0.023  0.104 0.127 -0.081 0.046 0.5730.6080.637 1259 
    (0.003)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)     
1999 Non-  0.031  0.118 0.149 -0.087 0.062 0.4270.3920.363  980 
  manufacturing  (0.007)  (0.021) (0.025) (0.018) (0.013)     
2000 Manufacturing  0.040  0.073 0.113 -0.033 0.080 0.4310.5710.635 1259 
    (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014)     
2000 Non-  0.092  0.095 0.187 -0.003 0.184 0.5690.4290.365  980 
  manufacturing  (0.048)  (0.015) (0.048) (0.052) (0.048)     
1999  ‘Traditional’  0.020  0.105 0.125 -0.084 0.041     1213 
  manufacturing  (0.003)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)     
2000  ‘Traditional’  0.038  0.072 0.110 -0.033 0.077     1213 
  manufacturing  (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013)     
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, based on 1000 repetitions; jcsh, jdsh and szsh denote share in job 
creation, job destruction and size share respectively. 
Source: Amadeus data set. 
 
 
Table 5 – Gross Job Flows in Manufacturing – Census-type Derzhkomstat Data 
 
Year pos  neg  gross  net  excess  n 
1997  0.016 0.099 0.115 -0.083 0.032  6189 
1998  0.020 0.081 0.101 -0.061 0.040  6189 
1999  0.021 0.079 0.100 -0.058 0.042  6189 
2000  0.034 0.079 0.113 -0.045 0.068  6189 
Note: See Table 3. 
Source: Ukrainian Statistical Office – Derzhkomstat. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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Table 6 – One-Year Persistence Rates for Annual Job Flows:  
Overall Sample and by Sector  
 
Category jcpers  jdpers 
Overall sample  0.804  0.886 
 (0.023)  (0.023) 
Sector jcpers  jdpers 
Manufacturing 0.852  0.861 
 (0.023)  (0.034) 
Non-manufacturing 0.740  0.926 
 (0.039)  (0.020) 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, based on 1000 repetitions; jcpers = job creation persistence rate, 
jdpers = job destruction persistence rate. 
Source: Amadeus data set. 
 
 
Table 7 – Decomposition of excess job reallocation (at the 2-digit level) 
 
Year Sector 
within-sector 
shifts 
between-sector 
shifts 
1999 manufacturing  0.952  0.048 
1999 non-manufacturing  0.972  0.028 
2000 manufacturing  0.666  0.334 
2000 non-manufacturing  0.622  0.378 
Note: The sector is excluded if the number of firms in this sector is less than 10 (sectors excluded are: Mining of 
coal and lignite, Manufacture of tobacco products, Manufacture of office machinery and computers, Recycling; 
Water transport, Air transport, Post and telecommunications, Financial intermediation, Renting services, Computer 
and related activities, Public administration and defence, Education, Sewage and refuse disposal, Other service 
activities). 
Source: Amadeus data set. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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Table 8 – Job Flow Rates and Shares by Ownership Type – Overall Sample 
 
Year 
Ownership 
type pos  neg  gross  net  excess jcsh jdsh szsh  n 
1999  Privatised 0.023 0.119 0.142 -0.096 0.046  0.503 0.619 0.567  1413 
   (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)     
1999  New  Private  0.192 0.069 0.261 0.123 0.138  0.139 0.012 0.019  132 
   (0.027)  (0.020)  (0.030) (0.036) (0.040)     
1999  State  0.022 0.097 0.119 -0.075 0.044  0.356 0.366 0.413  685 
   (0.005)  (0.017)  (0.019) (0.015) (0.011)     
2000  Privatised 0.049 0.089 0.138 -0.040 0.098  0.461 0.612 0.558  1413 
   (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) (0.013) (0.015)     
2000  New  private  0.159 0.134 0.293 0.025 0.268  0.057 0.035 0.021  132 
   (0.031)  (0.028)  (0.034) (0.048) (0.044)     
2000  State  0.068 0.067 0.135 0.001 0.134  0.482 0.350 0.419  685 
   (0.040)  (0.010)  (0.040) (0.044) (0.039)     
Note: See Tables 3 and 4. 
Source: Amadeus data set. 
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Table 9 a– Estimates of Firm Level Net Employment Growth Rate (Pooled OLS Estimates) 
Regressor  total sample  total sample, 
employment 
weights 
non-
manufacturing 
non-
manufacturing, 
employment 
weights 
manufacturing 
 
manufacturing,
employment 
weights 
 
ln(size) -0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.045*** 
(0.013) 
-0.033** 
(0.013) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
New 
private 
0.141*** 
(0.032) 
0.145*** 
(0.032) 
0.092** 
(0.039) 
0.097** 
(0.039) 
0.212*** 
(0.055) 
0.210*** 
(0.056) 
Privatised -0.009 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.014 
(0.020) 
-0.009 
(0.020) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.012) 
R
2  0.050 0.045 0.054 0.047 0.057 0.055 
N  4460 4460 1954 1954 2506 2506 
Note: Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in brackets; *** (**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1% (5%/10%) significance level. All regressions include 2-digit 
sector dummies and year dummies. Omitted ownership category: state-owned firms. 
Source: Amadeus data set. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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Table 9b– Estimates of Firm Level Net Employment Growth Rate in Manufacturing (Pooled OLS Estimates) 
Regressor trade-all Import-all trade-CIS import-CIS trade-EU  import-EU 
ln(size) 0.009 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
New 
private 
0.212*** 
(0.055) 
0.212*** 
(0.055) 
0.212*** 
(0.055) 
0.212*** 
(0.055) 
0.212*** 
(0.055) 
0.212*** 
(0.055) 
Privatised -0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
Relative 
Openness 
0.050*** 
(0.017) 
0.033*** 
(0.005) 
0.037*** 
(0.013) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
0.056*** 
(0.009) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
R
2  0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 
N  2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 
Note: Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in brackets; *** (**) denotes statistically significant at the 1% (5%) significance level. All regressions include 2-digit sector 
dummies and year dummies. Omitted ownership category: state-owned firms. 
Source: Amadeus data set 
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Table 9c– Estimates of Firm Level Net Employment Growth Rate in Manufacturing (Pooled OLS Estimates) 
Regressor Export-all  export-all export-CIS  export-CIS export-EU export-EU 
ln(size) 0.009 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
New private  0.212*** 
(0.055) 
0.140** 
(0.068) 
0.212*** 
(0.055) 
0.142** 
(0.068) 
0.212*** 
(0.055) 
0.139** 
(0.068) 
Privatised -0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.019 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.019 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
Relative Openness  0.031*** 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
0.024 
(0.016) 
0.023 
(0.022) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
Relative openness index 
*firm-level export dummy  – 
0.012*** 
(0.005) 
_ 0.007 
(0.007) 
_ 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
R
2  0.057 0.044 0.057 0.043 0.057 0.046 
N  2506 2012 2506 2012 2506 2012 
Note: Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in brackets; *** (**) denotes statistically significant at the 1% (5%) significance level. All regressions include 2-digit sector 
dummies and year dummies. Omitted ownership category: state-owned firms. 
Source: Amadeus data set. 
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Table 10 a– Estimates of Firm Level Employment Reallocation Rate (Pooled OLS Estimates) 
Regressor  total sample  total sample, 
employment 
weights 
non-
manufacturing 
non-
manufacturing, 
employment 
weights 
manufacturing 
 
manufacturing, 
employment 
weights 
 
ln(size) -0.025*** 
(0.005) 
-0.021*** 
(0.005) 
-0.026** 
(0.011) 
-0.020* 
(0.010) 
-0.023*** 
(0.005) 
-0.022*** 
(0.004) 
New private  0.059** 
(0.023) 
0.066*** 
(0.025) 
-0.005 
(0.029) 
-0.0002 
(0.029) 
0.178*** 
(0.043) 
0.183*** 
(0.043) 
Privatised -0.009 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.024 
(0.016) 
-0.022 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
0.0116 
(0.009) 
R
2  0.058 0.055 0.044 0.037 0.065 0.066 
N  4460 4460 1954 1954 2506 2506 
Note: Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in brackets; *** (**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1% (5%/10%) significance level. All regressions include 2-digit 
sector dummies and year dummies. Omitted ownership category: state-owned firms. 
Source: Amadeus data set. 
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Table 10 b– Estimates of Firm Level Employment Reallocation Rate in Manufacturing (Pooled OLS Estimates) 
Regressor trade-all Import-all trade-CIS import-CIS trade-EU  import-EU 
ln(size) -0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
New 
private 
0.178*** 
(0.044) 
0.178*** 
(0.044) 
0.178*** 
(0.044) 
0.178*** 
(0.044) 
0.178*** 
(0.044) 
0.178*** 
(0.044) 
Privatised 0.010 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
Relative 
Openness 
0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.016 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.016** 
(0.008) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
R
2  0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 
N  2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 
Note: Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in brackets; *** (**) denotes statistically significant at the 1% (5%) significance level. All regressions include 2-digit sector 
dummies and year dummies. Omitted ownership category: state-owned firms. 
Source: Amadeus data set. 
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Table 10c– Estimates of Firm Level Employment Reallocation Rate in Manufacturing (Pooled OLS Estimates) 
Regressor Export-all  export-all export-CIS  export-CIS export-EU export-EU 
ln(size) -0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.023*** 
(0.005) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.026*** 
(0.005) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.023*** 
(0.005) 
New private  0.178*** 
(0.044) 
0.102** 
(0.047) 
0.178*** 
(0.044) 
0.121*** 
(0.043) 
0.178*** 
(0.044) 
0.103** 
(0.046) 
Privatised 0.010 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
Relative Openness  0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.017 
(0.014) 
-0.019 
(0.022) 
0.0005 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Relative openness index 
*firm-level export dummy  – 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
_ 0.002 
(0.006) 
_ -0.004*** 
(0.001)  
R
2  0.065 0.039 0.065 0.042 0.065 0.040 
N  2506 2012 2506 2052 2506 2012 
Note: Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in brackets; *** (**) denotes statistically significant at the 1% (5%) significance level. All regressions include 2-digit sector 
dummies and year dummies. Omitted ownership category: state-owned firms. 
Source: Amadeus data set. 
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Table 11 – Impact of Relative Openness on Job Flows at the Two-Digit Sector Level 
Measure trade-all  Export-all  import-all  trade-CIS  export-CIS import-CIS  trade-EU  export-EU  import-EU 
Pos 0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.0003) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Neg -0.014*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.0003 
(0.005) 
Net 0.027*** 
(0.007) 
0.021*** 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
0.020 
(0.014) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.018*** 
(0.003) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
Gross 0.00003 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.003** 
(0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.0004 
(0.004) 
Excess 0.0007 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
0.0006 
(0.001) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.003*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
Note: Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in brackets; *** (**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1% (5%/10%) significance level. Coefficients come from OLS 
estimates of the various models based on equation (2).  
Source: Amadeus data set. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table A1 – Percentage Change in Trade Flows in Manufacturing  
in 1994-98 and 1994-2001 
Total Trade Flows  Imports  Exports 
  All CIS EU All CIS EU All CIS EU 
1994-98  45.5  -7.9 169.8 80.8  7.7 207.5 24.7 -17.0  124.4 
94-2001  66.7 -19.9  292.5 72.2 -26.4  251.2 63.5 -16.1  342.3 
Source: Ukrainian State Customs Committee. Only sectors used in the manufacturing sample of the Amadeus 
data set are included. 
 
Table A2 – Share of Trade Flows in Manufacturing to CIS and EU countries 
Total Trade 
Flows Imports  Exports 
 
Year 
EU/All CIS/All EU/All CIS/All EU/All CIS/All
1994  12.2 55.0 18.0 55.0  8.8  54.9 
1995  16.8 51.8 24.4 49.1 12.3 53.4 
1996  20.6 40.1 27.4 33.3 16.1 44.7 
1997  22.5 32.9 41.6 16.1 11.3 42.9 
1998  22.6 34.8 30.6 32.8 15.8 36.6 
1999  22.4 32.2 29.6 34.0 17.2 30.9 
2000  21.9 35.5 31.6 39.4 15.6 33.1 
2001  28.7 26.4 36.7 23.5 23.8 28.2 
Source: Ukrainian State Customs Committee. Only sectors used in the manufacturing sample of the Amadeus 
data set are included. 
 
Table A3 – Summary Statistics of Relative Openness Indices 
 
Index Min  Max  Median Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Trade-all 0  6.23  0.74  1.67  1.91 
Import-all 0  10.77  0.84  1.99  2.87 
Export-all 0  9.93  0.57  1.45  2.30 
Trade-CIS 0  5.74  0.56  1.38  1.58 
Import-CIS 0  15.31  0.64  1.75  3.14 
Export-CIS 0  4.55  0.55  1.21  1.36 
Trade-EU 0  13.48  0.98  1.99  2.73 
Import-EU 0  7.18  0.99  1.76  2.00 
Export-EU 0  34.88  0.32  2.42  6.80 
Source: own calculations. 
 
Table A4 – Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient 
Correlation between:  All countries  CIS  EU 
Total Trade Index-
Export Index 
0.8373 
(0.0000) 
0.9330 
(0.0000) 
0.5792 
(0.0019) 
Total Trade Index-
Import Index 
0.8024 
(0.0000) 
0.8701 
(0.0000) 
0.7757 
(0.0000) 
Export Index- 
Import Index 
0.4605 
(0.0179) 
0.7074 
(0.0001) 
0.1628 
(0.4269) 
Note: p-values in brackets.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 550 
  48
APPENDIX 2 
Definitions of variables used in regressions 
Employment is the average number of employees over the year.  
 
Size is the average of the firm’s employment in two successive years (e.g. 
size99=(emp99+emp98)/2). 
 
Manufacturing is a dummy variable equal to one if the enterprise’s main economic activity 
according to the 2-digit NACE-Rev.1 classification falls into the interval [10, 41] 
 
State is a dummy variable equal to one if the enterprise has state or municipal ownership or if 
the enterprise has been partly privatised before 1999 and more than 50% of shares belong to 
the state. Information about the type of ownership comes from the database of the Ukrainian 
State Property Fund accompanied with information about the registered legal form and name 
of the enterprise, and the date of its incorporation.  
 
Privatised is a dummy variable equal to one if the enterprise has been privatised before 1999 
and less than 50% of shares belong to the state. 
 
New Private is a dummy variable equal to one if the enterprise is 100 percent privately 
owned and newly established, i.e. it has never been a state enterprise. 
 
Relative openness index of a sector based on total trade is the relative share of imports and 
exports of the two-digit NACE sector j in year t (1996-98), weighted by its employment share 
in 1996: 
Openj,t = [(Importj,t + Exportj,t)/(Importtot,t + Exporttot,t)]/(employmentj,96 / employmenttot,96). 
Import and export volumes by countries of origin and destination (in thousands US dollars) 
come from the Ukrainian State Customs Committee data based on the six-digit Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System (HS). The employment share of the sector in 
1996 was calculated using the Derzhkomstat data set. 
 
 
Relative openness index of a sector  based on exports is the relative share of exports of the 
two-digit NACE sector j in year t (1996-98), weighted by its employment share in 1996: 
Open(export)j,t = ( Exportj,t/ Exporttot,t)/(employmentj,96 / employmenttot,96). 
 
 
Firm-level export dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s average export in 
1996-98 is larger than 0. Firm-level export volumes come from the Derzhkomstat data set. 
 
Relative openness index of a sector based on imports is the relative share of imports of the 
two-digit NACE sector j in year t (1996-98), weighted by its employment share in 1996: 
Open(import)j,t = ( Importj,t/ Importtot,t)/(employmentj,96 / employmenttot,96). 
These indices are averaged over the years 1996-1998 and calculated for the three geographic 
areas world, CIS and EU, leading to the nine indices shown in Table A3.  
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